

Conditionalities and Consequences: IMF and World Bank in Stateless Regions

Investments made by institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) serve as strategic tools aimed at alleviating global poverty and strengthening state capacities. However, these investments, along with their associated conditionalities, have long piqued the interest of economists and political scientists. This paper aims to assert that the investments made by entities such as the IMF and the World Bank in stateless societies do not lead to the ultimate strengthening of state structures.

To understand the influence of the World Bank and IMF on state formation, it is imperative to delve into their roles and inherent limitations. These organizations share a commendable overarching goal: eradicating extreme global poverty. Nevertheless, this virtuous aspiration is juxtaposed with a significant caveat — they are profit-oriented entities. This profit motive may sometimes clash with the objective of building a robust state. According to Fukuyama, a successful state aligns the scope of its responsibilities with its strength, enabling it to match the progress it is making. For a developing state, expanding its scope to encompass various aspects of political, economic, and bureaucratic stability is crucial. Consequently, the state's responsibilities must encompass tax collection, the operation of an efficient bureaucracy, and safeguarding the state to achieve success (Fukuyama 2004).

Tax collection, a fundamental state function, often proves challenging, particularly in regions with limited government presence (Ahmed et al., 2012). This challenge is pivotal, as taxation is a fundamental aspect of how states operate, and it is often intertwined with their historical formation. Tax revenues need to be used in a manner that the public can perceive and benefit from. In emerging states, where structural and infrastructural projects must precede widespread taxation, imposing taxes on citizens who may only be loyal to local governance

systems can be arduous. Consequently, many emerging states turn to loans, often provided by the IMF and the World Bank, to finance their projects and stimulate economic growth. However, this influx of money without the establishment of taxation infrastructure can lead to projects without long-term plans, resulting in a dependency on loans (Reinsberg, 2022).

The entanglement with loans extends beyond mere financial indebtedness; it encompasses the multifaceted conditions that the IMF and World Bank place on nations. The conditionalities imposed by institutions like the World Bank and IMF can hinder the development of an effective bureaucratic apparatus. These conditionalities often prioritize short-term objectives over the establishment of enduring bureaucratic systems, transforming governance into an entity focused on securing new loans through project implementation rather than ensuring stability and cohesion (Reinsberg 2022). This phenomenon is observed in Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) imposed by these organizations on developing states. SAPs include policies such as Trade Liberalization, which prohibits the imposition of trade tariffs and mandates the sale of land, resources, and industries to outside private interests (Thomson et al. 2017). The IMF and World Bank exert overarching control over bureaucratic systems, extending their influence from economics to politics.

Furthermore, these SAPs require states to reduce governmental actions within their borders. These conditions have significant political and social implications, as reduced government spending not only affects the state's capacity but also influences the political landscape. The reduction in government spending can propel authoritarian forms of governance to the forefront of politics, as they promise efficient use of resources directly benefiting citizens.

Once tax collection and an efficient bureaucratic apparatus are in place, the state can fulfill its core goal: protecting its citizens and their rights, including personal security, property

rights, and access to basic services. However, the involvement of institutions like the World Bank and IMF in stateless societies raises concerns, as they often extend resources and funding to autocratic regimes in pursuit of economic development, sometimes overlooking human rights issues (Zuckerman et al. 2015).

One noteworthy illustration of this complex issue involves instances where autocratic leaders have exploited opportunities to infringe upon citizens' rights, often exemplified by forced displacement without adequate compensation. For instance, a prominent case occurred in Indonesia, where the government forcibly relocated a village to make way for a dam construction project (Zuckerman et al. 2015). Research has revealed that, at times, the World Bank alone has been associated with the displacement of approximately 3.4 million people globally (Chavkin & Hudson 2015) despite its stated commitment to 'do no harm.' It is important to acknowledge that there can be valid reasons for nations to displace populations when accommodating essential infrastructure development. However, the challenge arises when organizations like the World Bank engage with states in projects that expand without simultaneously ensuring comprehensive support for those impacted by such expansions. These actions have contributed to a recurring pattern of displacements and humanitarian crises. In their pursuit of economic objectives, the World Bank and IMF have sometimes been criticized for appearing to turn a blind eye to oppressive practices, which in turn exacerbate the suffering of vulnerable populations.

In summary, the support provided by these institutions to dictatorial governments can paradoxically erode the very rights and protections that states should uphold. Their interference in stateless societies undermines stability and perpetuates cycles of displacement and human rights violations. Therefore, a thorough reevaluation of the World Bank and IMF's approach to

governance and development in such regions is necessary to ensure that the rights and well-being of citizens are not sacrificed for short-term economic gains.

All three fundamental elements of state-building have been substantially and detrimentally impacted by the policies of the IMF and the World Bank, with Zambia serving as a poignant case study. In the context of Zambia, the IMF played a pivotal role in the country's severe debt crisis during the 2020s (Thomas et al. 2023). This crisis resulted from specific policy choices made when Zambia entered into agreements with the IMF. One of the most significant policy conditions imposed was stringent limitations on government spending, leading to a significant reduction in resources allocated to critical public welfare programs and essential services (Thomas et al. 2023). Moreover, these policies led to job losses, further undermining Zambia's state capacity.

Another glaring omission was the IMF's failure to conduct a comprehensive social impact assessment before intervening in Zambia. Such an assessment is crucial to evaluate the potential repercussions of policy measures on the country's socio-economic fabric, especially for vulnerable and marginalized communities. The absence of this assessment led to policies that, while aimed at addressing economic challenges, deepened disparities and exacerbated the hardships faced by the Zambian people, particularly those in precarious socio-economic positions (Thomas et al. 2023).

In essence, the IMF's and World Bank's policies and actions in Zambia not only failed to strengthen the country's state institutions but actively contributed to the erosion of its social fabric. These shortcomings underscore the failures of institutions like the IMF and World Bank and how profit motives can distort positive goals into undesirable economic collapses. The IMF's

failures impacted the state's ability to collect taxes through staffing reductions, weakened the bureaucracy, and indebted the state to entities indifferent to citizens' well-being.

Proponents of these institutions would argue that the IMF and World Bank do have a positive impact and that the negative impacts cannot be attributed to the lender but instead to the incompetence of the state. While it is true that investments by organizations like the IMF and the World Bank have, in some cases, led to improvements in life expectancy, disease rates, and overall quality of life in certain nations, it is essential to recognize that these positive outcomes are not universal. The impact of these investments varies widely depending on a range of factors, including the competency of the borrowing nation's leadership, the specific conditions attached to loans, and the historical context in which these investments are made.

Firstly, the argument that nations should be held responsible for how they use borrowed funds is valid to a certain extent. However, it is essential to consider the power dynamics at play when these institutions enter into agreements with developing countries. Often, these nations find themselves in precarious financial situations, and they may not have the capacity or resources to make informed decisions about how to best utilize the funds received. The conditionalities imposed by the IMF and the World Bank can sometimes force governments into choices that are not in the best interest of their citizens, such as privatizing essential services or cutting social welfare programs.

Secondly, it's crucial to consider that positive statistics, such as increased life expectancy, can be misleading when taken out of context. To fully understand the impact of these investments, we must examine the broader picture. While some nations have experienced improvements, others have grappled with economic crises, social unrest, and human rights abuses resulting from these financial injections. As seen in the case of Zambia, stringent IMF

policies have demonstrated how such loans can lead to adverse consequences, including job losses and the erosion of social welfare programs. Loans from the IMF and World Bank should be seen as a double-edged sword. On one hand, they can significantly contribute to a nation's development if appropriate precautions are taken. However, without such precautions, they can bring about devastation and collapse.

Hence, due to this variation in effectiveness, we cannot overlook the argument that the IMF and World Bank are profit-oriented entities. Their primary goal is to ensure the repayment of loans with interest, and this profit motive can sometimes conflict with the long-term well-being of the borrowing nation's citizens. This conflict of interest can lead to short-term solutions that do not address the underlying structural issues that perpetuate poverty and instability in many countries.

While the IMF and World Bank share the altruistic goal of reducing poverty worldwide, their status as for-profit entities inhibits them from truly achieving this goal. From their restrictions on the three most essential facets of state building to their negligence when dealing with nations, there is much evidence against the IMF and World Bank's claims. I can conclude that the IMF and World Bank are not essential for the development of stateless societies.

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